Episode 19 — Identification and Authentication — Part Three: Evidence across the credential lifecycle
Welcome to Episode 19, Identification and Authentication — Part Three: Evidence across credential lifecycle. In any mature program, proof of control matters as much as the control itself. Identification and authentication evidence shows that the organization can demonstrate how credentials are issued, used, rotated, and retired without guesswork. Lifecycle control means you can trace each credential from its birth during enrollment to its final deactivation at deprovisioning, with verifiable steps in between. Assessors and auditors are not looking for perfect systems; they are looking for consistent proof that each stage happens as designed. Evidence transforms trust from assumption into documentation. Without it, even strong controls appear weak because there is nothing concrete to confirm that they operate continuously.
Building from that foundation, enrollment records with approver identity provide the starting point for every credential’s evidence trail. Each record should show who requested the credential, who verified the user’s identity, and who approved issuance. A timestamp and approver name make the event auditable and accountable. For example, a hardware token issued to an employee should link to a ticket showing their manager’s approval and the registrar’s confirmation of handoff. This record proves that the organization does not create accounts informally or without oversight. Enrollment evidence marks the moment when trust begins and shows that the first link in the chain was forged deliberately.
Next, maintain a complete authenticator inventory segmented by user type. The inventory lists which authenticators—passwords, hardware keys, smart cards, biometrics, or certificates—are assigned to employees, contractors, service accounts, and privileged users. It should capture serial numbers, issuance dates, expiration dates, and current status. Keeping it current allows quick validation that every credential is still active, properly assigned, and not duplicated. For example, an auditor may ask, “How many privileged users have hardware tokens, and when were they last replaced?” A clean inventory can answer instantly. Tracking authenticators by user type ensures proportional assurance and balanced coverage across populations.
Evidence also includes binding and revocation exports that prove how credentials are tied to users and how they are removed. Binding shows that an authenticator belongs to a specific person, device, or role. Revocation proves that access was cut off correctly and on time. Export files from the identity management system can display credential status changes with timestamps, approvers, and reasons for action. For instance, when an employee leaves, the revocation record should list both their accounts and the date tokens were invalidated. These exports are easy to overlook but powerful in review—they show lifecycle control in motion rather than only in policy.
Reset requests and verification proofs form another critical layer of evidence. Attackers often exploit reset processes, so being able to show that resets follow procedure is vital. Each reset should produce a ticket or log showing who requested it, what verification occurred, who approved it, and how success was confirmed. For example, if a user forgets their password, the help desk ticket should capture multi-factor validation before issuance of a new credential. Reviewers look for patterns—whether resets bypass checks or whether support staff document each step. Reset evidence proves that identity assurance remains intact even when users need help.
In parallel, recovery paths must be tested and logged regularly. Recovery procedures, such as account unlocks or emergency access, should be exercised on a predictable schedule and produce documented results. Logs should note who ran the test, when it occurred, what outcomes were observed, and whether any issues were corrected. These records show that recovery mechanisms function before an emergency rather than being theoretical. An untested process is a promise waiting to fail. Routine testing with evidence attached reassures reviewers that the organization’s authentication system can recover safely from disruptions.
Break-glass access, reserved for emergencies, must also be authenticated and monitored closely. Evidence here includes logs of each use, the reason for activation, the duration, and who approved the action. After use, reviews should confirm that accounts were disabled again and that all activities were captured in audit trails. For instance, if a break-glass account is used to restore a failed identity system, the evidence should include session logs, console output, and post-incident analysis. Auditors care less about whether emergencies happen and more about whether they are controlled. Break-glass evidence demonstrates that power was exercised responsibly and under watch.
Timely deprovisioning records complete the lifecycle picture by showing when access truly ends. Evidence should include reports of account disablement, token revocation, and system synchronization timestamps. Track the interval between a user’s separation date and the final credential deactivation. Metrics should demonstrate that most deprovisioning events complete within defined windows—often within twenty-four hours. When assessors ask, “How do you ensure former employees cannot log in?” these records answer precisely. Deprovisioning evidence proves closure: every identity lifecycle eventually ends, and no account outlives its purpose.
Federation assertions and mapping logs provide visibility into external identity trust. Federation events—authentication tokens issued by identity providers—should generate logs showing who authenticated, through which provider, and which attributes or roles were asserted. Mapping logs show how those attributes translate into local permissions. For example, a federated login from a partner organization might carry a “project manager” claim that maps to internal project folders. Keeping these logs allows verification that federated trust boundaries function as expected. They also help detect drift when external providers change configurations. Evidence here preserves confidence in delegated identity systems.
Session logs sampled for coverage verify that authentication continues working after login. A good sample includes normal sessions, administrative sessions, and terminations triggered by timeouts or anomalies. Reviewers expect to see timestamps, user identifiers, device data, and results of multifactor checks where applicable. Sampling sessions over time demonstrates that controls apply consistently and that monitoring detects abnormal patterns. For example, if a session persists beyond policy limits, logs should show an alert or forced reauthentication. Session evidence shifts focus from static credentials to ongoing assurance that identities behave as expected in real life.
All exceptions, waivers, and compensating controls should also be documented with supporting rationale. Exceptions might cover legacy systems that cannot support modern authentication methods; compensating controls could include network isolation or enhanced monitoring. Each record must list approval authority, start and end dates, and review outcomes. Assessors look for transparency—knowing that the organization is aware of and managing these deviations. Hidden exceptions create risk; documented ones show control. This evidence category proves that accountability persists even where ideal conditions do not.
When assessors arrive, their questions tend to follow predictable patterns. They will ask how credentials are issued, who approves them, how revocation is confirmed, and how reset requests are verified. They may request samples from recent months or test a single user’s journey from hire to termination. Being prepared means having organized evidence tied to ticket numbers and reports. Responses should be factual and traceable—no improvisation required. The goal is to let the evidence speak clearly, showing that lifecycle control is routine, not reactive. Confidence grows when proof appears instantly and matches the story already told.
