Episode 51 — System and Services Acquisition — Part Three: Evidence, contract hooks, and pitfalls
Welcome to Episode Fifty-One, System and Services Acquisition — Part Three: Evidence, contract hooks, and pitfalls. In this discussion, we turn from acquisition planning to the evidence that proves those plans are working. Assurance is never just a feeling or a promise; it is something that can be shown. When an organization acquires a system or service, it must ensure that the supplier’s security claims are backed by real, reviewable artifacts. These proofs allow buyers to verify that requirements were met and that future risks are manageable. Without evidence, contracts become faith-based rather than fact-based. By understanding what to request, how to embed it in agreements, and how to assess what comes back, a team can transform procurement into a genuine risk control.
Building on that foundation, every strong contract defines its required security deliverables. These are not vague gestures like “maintain good cybersecurity practices,” but concrete outputs: policy statements, testing results, or configuration documentation. A well-written agreement lists these deliverables alongside the functional specifications of the system itself. For example, a vendor providing a managed database service might be required to supply encryption implementation details and annual audit summaries. The purpose is to make evidence production as routine as feature delivery. Ambiguity is the enemy of enforcement, so these deliverables must be measurable and unambiguous. When both parties understand what will be produced and when, the contract becomes a living framework for accountability rather than a paper promise.
Expanding that concept, supplier attestations and verification artifacts reinforce trust beyond the initial build. An attestation is a formal statement from the supplier declaring that certain controls are in place and functioning. Verification artifacts support those claims, such as audit reports, scan outputs, or third-party certifications. Together, they provide confidence that the supplier’s environment and processes meet agreed standards. For example, a cloud service provider might furnish a current independent assessment under recognized frameworks to confirm compliance. However, attestations should never replace independent verification. They are a starting point for dialogue and proof, not an endpoint. A mature acquisition process treats attestations as snapshots of due diligence, not as guarantees.
Continuing into development practices, secure development life cycle evidence demonstrates that security is built in, not added later. It includes documentation of threat modeling, code reviews, security testing, and change tracking. Buyers should expect to see how issues were discovered, prioritized, and resolved. A simple example might involve reviewing a vendor’s static analysis reports to confirm consistent use of secure coding libraries. This evidence shows that the supplier’s internal controls function effectively before release. Many organizations overlook this layer, assuming that final testing alone proves security, but process-level evidence paints a fuller picture. It demonstrates that risk was managed from design through delivery, not retrofitted under pressure.
Linked closely to development discipline is the question of code provenance and component traceability. Provenance describes where code originates, who authored it, and what external components are included. Traceability allows every dependency to be followed back to its source. This matters because modern systems are often built from thousands of modules, many open source and beyond direct control. When provenance is unclear, hidden vulnerabilities or licensing risks can creep in. For instance, if a vendor cannot trace a third-party library’s origin, the buyer inherits that uncertainty. Requiring traceability documentation ensures accountability for what enters your environment. It is a way of extending the chain of trust into the code itself, making invisible dependencies visible and manageable.
Complementing provenance requirements, software bills of materials submissions, often called S B O M s, have become a key expectation. An S B O M lists all components and dependencies within a software product, like an ingredient label for code. It enables buyers to quickly assess exposure when new vulnerabilities are announced. For example, if a library used in many applications is found to be flawed, the S B O M helps identify affected systems in hours instead of weeks. Contracts that require regular S B O M updates turn this practice into an operational safeguard. The real challenge is maintaining accuracy as software evolves, but automation tools and supplier commitments can help. Ultimately, an S B O M ensures transparency and responsiveness in an unpredictable threat landscape.
Alongside component inventories, test reports and remediation tracking provide tangible proof that controls actually work. A test report summarizes what was examined, the results, and the actions taken. Remediation tracking shows how findings were corrected and verified. Together, they transform testing from a one-time activity into a continuing assurance process. Suppose a supplier’s report reveals ten medium-severity issues. The remediation log should document when each was fixed and who verified it. Without that follow-up, evidence remains incomplete. Effective contracts specify formats, frequencies, and responsible roles for these reports. In this way, test evidence evolves from raw data into structured proof that obligations have been met.
Turning to performance and reliability, service commitments, service level agreements, and service level objectives formalize how a supplier measures and maintains delivery. An S L A describes the guaranteed level of service—such as uptime or response time—while an S L O outlines the internal target used to meet or exceed that level. For example, a managed hosting provider might commit to ninety-nine point nine percent uptime under its S L A but internally strive for ninety-nine point nine five. These targets, supported by monitoring evidence, shape both operational trust and accountability. The key is ensuring that security and availability metrics coexist, so that performance never undermines protection. When evidence of S L A compliance is shared openly, it becomes part of the buyer’s continuous assurance picture.
As contracts look ahead, escrow provisions, exit plans, and portability clauses protect against disruption. Escrow refers to storing critical code, documentation, or encryption keys with a neutral third party so that access can continue if the vendor fails. Exit plans outline how systems and data will be transitioned back or to a new provider, ensuring continuity. Portability focuses on avoiding lock-in by requiring standard formats and export mechanisms. Consider a software-as-a-service product: without clear exit terms, retrieving customer data could become difficult if the relationship ends. Embedding these clauses from the start turns potential crises into manageable transitions. They provide structure for maintaining control over long-term dependencies.
Moving toward lessons learned, common pitfalls and negotiation strategies remind us that even strong contracts can falter in execution. Pitfalls include vague terms, missing evidence requirements, or acceptance criteria that are impossible to measure. Negotiations often focus on price and deadlines while leaving security clauses underdeveloped. A better approach begins with clarity—defining outcomes, evidence formats, and review rights early. For example, negotiating the inclusion of an S B O M at project inception costs less than requesting it after delivery. The most effective teams approach negotiation as risk alignment rather than confrontation. By explaining the rationale behind each clause, they turn potential tension into mutual understanding.
Drawing all these threads together, evidence-backed and enforceable agreements are what transform acquisition from procurement into assurance. Each clause, deliverable, and artifact tells a part of the story about how security, reliability, and accountability are built and maintained. When evidence requirements are explicit, both sides understand their roles in managing risk. Contracts stop being static documents and become active instruments of trust. The effort spent defining, collecting, and validating evidence pays dividends long after deployment. In the end, strong acquisition practices do not just secure systems; they secure relationships grounded in proof, transparency, and shared responsibility.
